The Effect of Sino-Indian War, 1962 on Ethnic Communities of Arunachal Pradesh by Sayeda , Fauzia Farmin & Barnali Sarma
Farmin & Sarma. Space and Culture, India 2020, 8:2  Page | 168 
https://doi.org/10.20896/saci.v8i2.768 
© 2020 Farmin & Sarma. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction 
in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. 
 
PERSPECTIVE          OPEN ACCESS 
The Effect of Sino-Indian War, 1962 on Ethnic Communities of Arunachal Pradesh  
Sayeda Fauzia Farmin†* and Dr Barnali Sarma¥ 
Abstract  
The study is an attempt to analyse the socio-economic consequences of Sino-Indian war of 1962 on 
the ethnic communities of North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA), the present state of Arunachal 
Pradesh, geospatially located in North-East India. A careful analysis of the pre-independent history 
of the region suggests that both Ahoms and British rulers followed a policy of non-interference in 
the region as it was predominantly a tribal area. After independence, the Indian Government also 
followed the policy of minimal governance. The vital issues of infrastructure were also not given 
much emphasis until the war of 1962. As the Government realised the strategic importance of the 
state, a significant change in government policy can be witnessed. Apart from initiating 
development in infrastructure of the state, efforts were also made to nationalise the frontier. The 
present research aims to document the socio-economic changes brought by the war, using a critical 
analysis of a wide range of sources.  
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Introduction 
The central purpose of this study is to investigate 
the effect of the Sino-Indian War, 1962 on ethnic 
communities of Arunachal Pradesh. The present 
state of Arunachal Pradesh, (formerly known as 
North East Frontier Agency, abbreviated as 
NEFA) is located in North East India, which is 
popularly known as the land of the Rising Sun. 
The Sino-Indian war of 1962 constitutes an 
important event of Indian history with far-
reaching consequences. Like most wars of world 
history, the Sino-Indian war had its antecedent 
in border disputes. Aksai Chin, an area lying 
between the Chinese autonomous region of 
Xinjiang and Tibet was claimed by India as a part 
of Kashmir region, whereas China claimed it to 
be a part of Xinjiang (Kumar, 2013).  China 
questioned the legitimacy of the McMahon 
Line,1 which separates NEFA2  from China. 
Although the dispute over the McMahon line 
remained dormant, it gained intensification after 
the flight of the Tibetan leader Dalai Lama into 
India by crossing the frontier of Assam on 31 
March 1959. A series of border skirmishes 
followed the incident. 
The actual war began on 20 October 1962, which 
lasted for two months after the Chinese army 
defeated Indian forces. Even though the war 
lasted for barely two months, the consequences 
were tremendous in the political, economic, and 
diplomatic aspects. According to the 1965 report 
of the Indian Defence Ministry, 1383 Indian 
soldiers were killed, 1696 were missing in action, 
3968 soldiers were captured, and 1047 were 
wounded. The Chinese casualties were less 
when compared to Indian counterparts with 722 
deaths and 1696 wounded (Burkitt, Scobell & 
Wortzel, 2003).  A report released by the Indian 
Ministry of Defence had stated that there was no 
precise estimate of casualties. There was a lack 
of organisation during the induction of troops in 
NEFA. The process of withdrawal too lacked 
organisation. The mountain divisions broke up 
                                                          
1 The McMahon Line is the demarcation line between Tibet and North- East region of India. It was proposed by the 
British delegate Henry McMahon at the 1914 Shimla Conference. The Shimla Conference itself is an intricate exercise in 
diplomacy, power politics and espionage (for details, please read, Maxwell, 1970). 
2 The term NEFA will mostly be used as the region was known as NEFA in the period under discussion 
into small groups who went their own way. 
Moreover, due to the harsh terrain of the 
battlefield, many dead bodies were never 
recovered. Due to these factors, it would never 
be possible to precisely determine how many 
soldiers were killed due to enemy action or 
extreme cold climatic conditions of the state of 
Arunachal Pradesh (India, 2006). The study 
begins with a review of relevant literature on the 
subject of study. This will be followed by a 
discussion of the methodology employed for this 
study. Following this, it will critically discuss the 
pre-independence history of NEFA; 
development of infrastructure and 
nationalisation of the frontier. 
Review of Literature 
The Sino-Indian war of 1962 is a widely 
researched subject. From academicians to 
soldiers, experts from diverse fields have written 
their version of history about the war. Most of 
them stress on the background and events 
leading to the war. Mention may be made of 
Himalayan Blunder: The Curtain-Raiser to Sino-
Indian war, 1962 by Brigadier J. P. Dalvi (1969). 
The book reflects on the immediate background 
of the war as well as a Brigadier’s experience in 
conducting affairs at the battlefield. The book 
has exposed the politicisation of Indian army 
which can be accounted for as a major reason for 
the failure of India. Apart from writing about the 
bravery of Indian soldiers, he has written in 
occasional instances about the porters, 
engineers, medical officers; whose contributions 
cannot be neglected. Another authoritative 
account of the war — India's China War by 
Neville Maxwell (1970). While discussing the 
background of the war, the author based his 
views upon the classified account of the 
Henderson Brooks-Bhagat report. Based on 
official sources, the book gives an in-depth 
analysis of the official affairs of both nations 
during the war. It is the first account that has 
discussed the forward policy of Indian Prime 
Farmin & Sarma. Space and Culture, India 2020, 8:2  Page | 170 
 
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Air Marshall Bharat 
Kumar, in the book Unknown and Unsung: Indian 
Air Force in Sino-Indian war of 1962 (2013) has 
reflected on the role of Indian Air Force in the 
war. There remained a perception that air force 
was not used during the war. On the contrary, 
the Indian Air Force (IAF) had been involved in 
the logistical build-up in Ladakh and NEFA right 
from the time the first of many posts was set up 
in 1950. If we consider the role of IAF in the war, 
the book has succeeded mainly in its reflection. 
Wing Commander M. Sadatulla’s1962 War: 
Supplying from the Air(2013) is another account 
that has dealt with the contribution of Indian Air 
Force towards war efforts. Shiv Kunal 
Verma's1962: The War That Wasn’t (2016) is 
another detailed account of the war. The book is 
a definitive account of the conflict, based on 
dozens of interviews with soldiers, officers, 
support staff, bureaucrats, and numerous others 
who had a first-hand view of what actually 
happened in 1962. As the author is from a non-
military background, the book is free from biases 
that a soldier might commit to conceal the faults 
on military lines. Mention can also be made of 
Bharat Rakshak, a website devoted to discussing 
India's military affairs (India, 2006). It was 
started in 1997 by bringing together individual 
websites of Indian defence enthusiasts. In 2006, 
the site leaked Official war histories written by 
Indian Ministry of Defence that had remained 
classified for some time. The official war history 
of 1962 Sino-India war can be included in the 
literature regarding the event. The work 
contains ten chapters which discuss the 
circumstances and course of war from a military 
perspective. The work is relevant for 
understanding the official point of view 
regarding the war. 
China’s India War: Collision Course on the Roof of 
the World  authored by Bertil Lintner (2018) has 
questioned Neville Maxwell’s narrative. 
Lintner(2018) (insert year of publication) argues 
that China began planning the war as early as 
1959 and thus, the forward policy of Nehru 
cannot be accused as the main reason for Sino-
Indian war of 1962. Shadow States - India, China 
and the Himalayas, 1910–1962 by 
BéréniceGuyot-Réchard (2017) is an important 
work on the topic. Here, the Sino Indian tension 
has been looked into from the perspective of 
competitive state-building. It involves a study of 
the simultaneous approach to achieve the 
support and acceptance of the people. In the 
20th Century, there loomed considerably the 
tension between China and India for acquiring 
political hegemony in the Himalayan region. 
Their lack of strong ties to the region and the 
absence of an easily enforceable border made 
their proximity threatening. Observing China and 
India's state-making efforts, the local inhabitants 
were in a position to compare and potentially 
choose between them. Amid their state making 
efforts and the existence of an uncordial relation 
between the two entities, the local people had 
no other option but to choose their position 
between one of the two belligerents. The book 
provides an in-depth understanding of the 
genesis in the Indo China conflict. 
 Apart from Berenice Guyot Rechard’s (2017) 
work, the existing literature has mostly stressed 
on the causes and consequences of the war. The 
war had many socio-economic impacts that had 
not gained due attention in the existing 
literature. The region of NEFA was particularly 
affected.  After the war, the Central Government 
had made a significant shift in the policies 
adopted towards the tribes inhabiting the 
frontier regions of North-East India. As the 
Government realised the strategic importance of 
NEFA, particular emphasis was laid on the 
development of infrastructure in the hitherto 
neglected region. Apart from developmental 
efforts, measures were taken towards 
nationalisation of the frontier.   
 From the above discussion on the existing 
literature related to the war, it can be witnessed 
that the political outcome of the war is 
overemphasised, neglecting the socio-economic 
consequences of the event. The objective of the 
study is, therefore, to fill the gap in the existing 
literature by analysing the socio-economic 
changes brought by the war in the subsequent 
decades. As stated above, the study will also look 
into the nationalisation efforts initiated by the 
Central Government and the responses of the 
Farmin & Sarma. Space and Culture, India 2020, 8:2  Page | 171 
 
tribal communities of NEFA to those policies. The 
methodology is discussed in the next section.  
Methodology  
The present study follows historical 
methodology based on critical use of a range of 
primary and secondary sources, such as books, 
newspapers, government documents, 
documentary etc. To establish authenticity, 
gathered sources are evaluated, corroborated 
and then reproduced after careful and critical 
analysis. The following section discusses the pre-
independence history of NEFA.  
Pre-Independence History of NEFA 
Arunachal Pradesh is the largest state of North-
East region of India and has one-eighth landmass 
of our country. It covers an area of 83743 sq.Kms 
(32333 square miles) and a long international 
border with Bhutan in the West (160 Kms; 99 
miles), China in the north and north-east (1,080 
Kms; 671 miles), and Myanmar in the east (440 
Kms; 273 miles). It expands from the snow-
covered mountains in the north to the 
Brahmaputra plains in the south (Singh, 2011). 
The mountain ranges of NEFA cover about 85 per 
cent of the total area of the state. The 
configuration of the land surface is extremely 
varied with an elevation of about 175 metres in 
the south to more than 5000 metres in the north. 
From the Brahmaputra valley in the south, the 
land gradually rises towards the north and finally 
penetrates the high mountain ranges of Eastern 
Himalayas. In general, the whole of NEFA is 
highly desiccated and has a rugged topography 
with very limited level land (Pande, 1997). 
  The pre-modern history of the region is 
shrouded amid traditions and mythology. Early 
reference of it can be traced in the epic stories 
of Mahabharata . In fact, the local traditions tend 
to identify the region around Sadiya as the 
ancient Vidarbha (Hussain, 1998:9). The 
archaeological remains at Malinithan too speaks 
                                                          
3 The posa system was introduced by the Ahom 
government to put a stop to the inroads of the hill people 
to the bordering territories. The Ahom government gave 
fertile lands to the hill people at the foot of their hills called 
‘khats’ along with access to certain fisheries in the plains. 
In lieu of fertile lands, the Ahom government also paid a 
stipulated amount called posa consisting of such articles as 
of Hindu contacts in the place. The remnants 
date back to the 13th – 14th  Century, historically 
suggesting to have been constructed by the 
Chutiya kings (Sharma, 1988). Another heritage 
site is the Tawang Monastery which speaks of 
local connections with Buddhism. It was for the 
geographical proximity with Tibet that the 
Tibetan culture found a space in the hearts and 
mind of the people in the region. However, 
recorded history of the place is available only in 
the Ahom chronicles from the 17th Century.   
Hilly terrain with occasional valleys, the area is 
inhabited by around twenty-six major tribes, 
living in secluded and isolated grooves. The 
inhospitable terrain of mountain ridges, gushing 
rivers dense forests restricts the easy movement 
of people. The political relationship between the 
hills and the plains has always been a unique 
one. During the Ahom rule (1228- 1826), the hill 
tribes of the neighbouring regions were allowed 
certain rights and privileges in the foot-hill lands 
of the plains, including the right of posa,3 that is, 
the main objective of this system was to defend 
the peasants cultivating in the foothills, whose 
products were often plundered by the hill tribes. 
Due to the rugged terrain of the hills, all products 
of necessity could not be produced by hill-
people. Therefore, they resorted to plundering 
and other unfair means to collect their 
necessities. The posa system introduced by the 
Ahoms put an end to hostilities between the hill 
tribes and plains people (Barpujari, 2007).  In 
general, the Ahom kings adopted a policy of 
conciliation towards the tribes, supporting it by 
a display of force when it could be effectively 
employed. When the British took over the 
control of Assam, they largely followed the 
policy of the Ahom kings. They protected the 
plains people against their raids, established 
outposts in the foothills and from time to time 
imposed a blockade and undertook punitive 
rice, cloth, cattle etc to be collected from a class of people 
called paiks assigned to them. The Ahoms organised the 
society on the basis of paik or khel system, which was the 
backbone of the socio-political organisation of medieval 
Assam. It was a system of exacting personal service from 
the subjects by the Ahom rulers (for details, please read, 
Baruah, 1985).  
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expeditions against the frontier tribes (Hussain, 
1998). 
In 1874, the Britishers passed the Scheduled 
District Act 4 to enforce a uniform administrative 
setup. In 1914, the Government of India issued a 
notification to apply Assam Frontier Tracts 
Regulation of 1880 to the areas of Adis, 
Mishimis, Nagas etc. and these hilly areas were 
separated from Darrang and Lakhimpur district 
of Assam and constituted into the North- East 
Frontier Tract (NEFT). In 1919, some changes 
were made and in 1935, these areas were 
converted into excluded areas under the control 
of the Governor of Assam. Thus, there has been 
a gradual political evolution. Between 1935 and 
1943 this excluded area was placed directly 
under the control of the Governor of Assam, who 
ruled it in his discretion through an advisor. After 
independence, the responsibility to administer 
the Frontier Tracts was handed over to the 
Government of Assam. On 26 January 1950 the 
Constitution of India was proclaimed and along 
with it, a further change in administration was 
affected. NEFT was scheduled as part of Assam, 
but its administration was handed over to the 
Governor of Assam, who will act as an agent of 
the President of India. The next significant 
development was introduced in 1954 with the 
introduction of the North East Frontier Area 
(Administration) Regulation. The regulation 
formed NEFA, and fresh reorganisation of the 
existing administrative units was conducted, and 
consequently, some areas of Abor Hills district 
and Mishmi Hills district were transferred to the 
plains and the remaining hill areas were 
comprised in the hilly region of NEFA. The 
number of administrative divisions was raised to 
five from two divisions. Each division was placed 
under the charge of a Deputy Commissioner 
(Singh, 2011).   
                                                          
4 The Scheduled District Act xiv of 1874 is an act of British 
Indian Government by which certain territories annexed 
by the British government were constituted as scheduled 
tracts. By the provisions of this act, extensive powers were 
vested in the local government (for details, refer to 
Bhattacharjya, 1991) 
5 Kebang is traditional village council of the Adis. The prime 
responsibility of the village councils is to enforce law and 
As already stated, the British maintained close 
control over the frontier tracts, treating them as 
excluded areas and sending out expeditionary 
missions as and when occasions demanded. 
After independence, the Government of India 
was also in favour of gradual political evolution. 
Prime Minister Nehru enunciated five principles 
of tribal administration, which later became 
famous as Panchasheel principles on tribal 
issues. He expressed them in the foreword that 
he wrote for Verrier Elwin (1959)’s book 
Philosophy for NEFA. The five principles may be 
summarised as: 
 The indigenous people should be left to 
pursue their lives based on their own 
cultural practices and traditional art.  
 Tribal rights in land and forests should be 
respected.  
 A team of their own people ought to be 
developed – trained with the intricacies 
of modern administration, development 
strategies and technical know-how. But 
intrusion of  too many outsiders should 
be avoided wherever possible.. 
 The stringent administrative procedure, 
complicated schemes should be avoided, 
rather development should be worked 
upon in coordination with the traditional 
social and cultural institutions. 
 Results should be computed based on 
qualitative development rather than on 
the statistics of money expended in the 
region. It should be an attempt to win 
peoples’ heart(Elwin, 1959: xi) 
 To execute his principles into practice, tribal 
institutions of village councils like the Kebang 5 
of the Adis and Buliang 6of the Apatanis were 
reactivated. A host of tribal interpreters was 
employed to serve as intermediaries between 
the administration and the local people. In 1956, 
a cadre of Indian Frontier Administrative Service 
order in the society. There are other village councils of 
other tribes, such as, Buliang, Nyele etc. kebang is 
considered to be the most democratic village council of 
the tribes inhabiting Arunachal Pradesh. 
6 Buliang is the traditional village council of the Apatanis. 
The responsibility of the tribal village councils is to enforce 
law and order in the society. 
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(IFAS) was created to give impetus to 
developmental activities. A relatively large 
number of qualified tribal officers from other 
tribal areas of Assam were employed for 
absorption in the Frontier service. As a result, an 
excellent right proportion of middle-rung 
officers were tribespeople themselves. These 
frontier officers were pioneers and worked with 
great zeal and zest as harbingers of 
development. To carry out their mission, they 
trekked thousands of miles on foot and faced 
immense hurdles (Singh, 2011).   
The developments immediately following the 
war of 1962 are of particular importance which 
will be discussed later. It is to be mentioned that 
NEFA was constitutionally a part of Assam state 
until 1972. On 21 January, NEFA was designated 
as a Union territory of India and renamed 
Arunachal Pradesh. Another significant 
development came in the year 1987 when 
Arunachal Pradesh achieved statehood on 20 
February (Cultural Roots of Arunachal Pradesh, 
2019; Hussain, 1998:2). Development of 
infrastructure is discussed in the next section.  
Development of Infrastructure 
When the British left in August 1947, there was 
no 'core service' worth the name in the interior 
of the frontier tracts. They did not bother to 
create a nexus of social – welfare and technical 
services in the Hills. Communication, medical 
service, educational facilities were as good as 
non-existent. All that existed by way of 
communication was 168 Km of roads in the 
plains areas, mostly along the foothills; there 
were 13 hospital and dispensaries and one leper 
colony— all located on the fringe of the hills; 
educational facilities consisted of two lower 
primary schools also located at the foot of the 
hills. So when the Government of India decided 
to carry the benefits of modern administration 
and social services to the people in the hills, it 
was obliged to build from scratch (Chowdhury, 
1996). 
 During the year 1948-49, that is, after 
independence, a total expenditure of INR 
700,000 was incurred for the whole area. It went 
up to INR 1,200,000 in 1950-51. During all these 
years, government spending accounted 
primarily for the spread of administration into 
the interior of the hills and building up 
communication lines, even though rudimentary. 
The full-scale development scheme was put into 
operation in 1953 after definite allotments on 
different heads of expenditure in the First Five 
Year plan (1950-55). A sum of INR 13,500,000 
was allotted in the First Five Year Plan for the 
development of communication. From the mid-
1950s, when border skirmishes were going on, 
the Central Government paid particular 
attention to the development of roads and 
communication in the area. Both the Central and 
State Governments realised the importance of 
road connectivity and efforts were initiated to 
improve and strengthen the transport 
infrastructure in the state. In the Second 
FiveYear plan (1956-61), INR  50,956,000 was 
allocated in the sphere of communication. Out of 
the total plan outlay, road construction alone 
appropriated INR   15,400,000, and INR 
2,560,000 was allotted separately for the 
building of airstrips (Chowdhury 1996: 251). At 
the end of the period, roads were pushed 
through to all the five divisional headquarters, 
and 13 airstrips of various sizes were 
constructed. The task of major road-building 
projects was transferred from the Central Public 
Works Department (CPWD) to the Border Roads 
Organisation, which popularly came to be known 
as ‘Tusker’ (Chowdhury 1996:251).  For the 
provision and maintenance of vital strategic 
communication in the belligerent terrain of the 
border, the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) 
was set up on 7 May 1960 (Dalvi, 1969). BRO 
raised project Vartak with the aim of efficient 
management of the Indo-China border. The 
organisation commenced survey operations in 
1960. The workers of BRO had to work under 
immense difficulties due to lack of resources 
allotted to them and frequent landslides in the 
Southern slides of the Himalayas. 
The major problem of building roads in the 
sector was the lack of stones to lay a metal 
foundation for the roads at convenient 
distances. Despite that, by 1962 a fair-weather 
one-ton road in Dirang valley was opened for 
vehicular traffic in the dry months. The road 
from Dirang to Tawang via Sela was barely fit for 
Farmin & Sarma. Space and Culture, India 2020, 8:2  Page | 174 
 
vehicles. There were numerous landslides and 
slushy patches where the hills were cut to widen 
the track. Sela was hugely snow-fed, and the 
engineers of BRO working at the height of over 
1300 feet could not clear the track there despite 
of immense effort due to lack of modern 
equipment. Therefore, motor transport could 
not ply across the region.  As such, there were no 
proper means of carrying loads in the 
mountains. Indian soldiers, not acclimatised to 
the hilly areas had to solely depend on the 
Animal Transport Company where local people 
were recruited (Dalvi, 1969:127). Lack of road 
infrastructure was one of the crucial causes of 
the failure of the Indian army in the 1962 war.  
Table 1: Five-Year Plans and Expenditure on NEFA 
Year Expenditure (in INR ) 
First Five Year Plan(1950-55)  30,000,000 
Second Five Year Plan(1956-61) 50,956,000 
Third Five Year Plan(1962-66) 71,500,000 
Source: Chowdhury 1996: 251 
India’s failure in the 1962 war influenced the 
shaping of the Third Five Year Plan (1962-66). 
The total outlay for NEFA in the Third Five-Year 
Plan was further enhanced, raising it to INR 
71,500,000 (Table 1). Besides normal allocation 
for communication, an extra allotment of INR  
20,800,000 was provided in the plan for 
improvement of communication (Chowdhury, 
1996:253). 
Earlier, because of the increasing strategic 
importance of the border roads, a Border Road 
Development Board had come up in New Delhi, 
and the Tusker in NEFA was made subordinate to 
it. Tusker came under severe criticism previously 
for slow progress in the execution of 
construction works. However, as already 
mentioned, the staff of Tusker had to work 
under severe circumstances due to landslides. 
Lack of modern equipment posed another 
problem. Nevertheless, unsatisfactory 
performance of the Tusker prompted the 
Government to entrust the construction and 
improvement of certain strategic highways to 
Army Engineer Corps in 1963. The targets set for 
the Third Five Year Plan concerning 
communication were 419 miles (672km) of 
jeepable roads, 153 miles(246km) of mule track, 
841 miles(1353km) of porter tracks besides 
improvement of existing roads. Construction of 
seven new airstrips and improvement of existing 
13 airstrips were undertaken and completed in 
record time during the Third Five Year Plan 
period. The performance at the end of the plan 
period registered a higher mark (Chowdhury 
1996:253).  
 Being a sparsely populated hilly terrain, NEFA 
had a self-sufficient economy. The unfavourable 
ecological environment sets certain outer limits 
beyond which human habitation and economic 
substances can rarely be possible. The areas 
beyond the altitudinal zone of 3000m make such 
limits. Besides, the distribution of the population 
is also influenced by the prevailing socio-
economic setup of the state. The practices of 
shifting cultivation, communitarian ownership of 
land and clan territorial organisation of the social 
structure of the tribal groups have a bearing on 
the sparsely and uneven distribution of 
population in the state (Sharma 2008:15) Prior to 
the war, the modern way of the economy still 
had not arrived in the remote areas. Despite the 
harshness of nature, they had terraced fields and 
grew a variety of cereals, vegetables and fruits. 
Barter economy prevailed there. During the war, 
the army recruited them as civil porters. 
Brigadier J. P. Dalvi (Commander of 7th Indian 
Infantry Brigade) has mentioned about an 
interesting incident about ethnic porters of 
Tawang. When the porters were paid in cash, 
they hardly knew what to do with the coins 
earned. Dalvi has written how the arrival of the 
army brought a significant change in their 
economic life. As Dalvi (1969: 128) state:  
The advent of the Army, Border Roads 
and the Civil Administration had upset 
their traditional life, and suddenly they 
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found themselves earning and spending 
large sums of money, in place of the 
traditional barter system…at first, they 
did not know what to do with this 
strange means of payment for labour, 
services and goods, and just stuffed 
their notes in bamboo containers. 
Later, when the Administration opened 
stores, they shopped enthusiastically 
for the things that we are pleased to call 
the blessings of science and 
civilization… Bhutanese traders soon 
learnt to cater to their tastes and 
reaped a rich harvest at the monthly 
bazaar in Tawang. (Dalvi, 1969:128). 
Thus, the arrival of the army also brought 
money economy to the region of Tawang. 
Earlier, the barter economy prevailed in the 
region. Gradually, with the expansion of the 
market, the ethnic porters learnt to cater to 
their needs in exchange for money. 
The medical facility was also non-existent in the 
region. The extension of medical services got 
into stride in 1951 with the establishment of a 
separate Medical Department (Chowdhury 
1996:252). At the end of the First FiveYear Plan, 
there were 19 hospitals, 22 indoor dispensaries, 
17 outdoor dispensaries, 20 mobile health units, 
three leper colonies and 27 anti-malaria units. By 
the end of the  Second Five Year Plan , eight base 
hospitals, located at divisional and sub-divisional 
headquarters, one central laboratory, one 
training-cum-research centre, a central 
tuberculosis hospital and 85 health units were 
added to the list (Chowdhury 1996:252). With 
the mobility of troops, modern medical facilities 
were introduced in the region. In 1960, when 
war preparations were going on, a Mobile 
Surgical Unit and a field ambulance were set up 
in Tawang. Within a week of their arrival Major 
Jayaraman, the Officer Commanding, performed 
a life-saving abdominal surgery using petromax 
lamps and hurricane lights . Thereafter, 
everything possible was done to house and look 
after this unit. By 1961, a 25-bedded hospital 
was established in Tawang (Dalvi, 1969:114). 
Gradually a concrete floor was provided and 
annexes built to protect medical stores and 
provide recreational centres. An X-ray plant was 
installed later. The plant was carried through 
Sela pass by 16 porters. The medical unit became 
extremely popular among the civilians and the 
locals, who previously never enjoyed the 
blessings of modern medicine and surgery (Dalvi 
1969:114). The nationalisation of the frontier is 
being discussed in the next section.  
Nationalisation of the Frontier 
Apart from the developments in infrastructure 
and medical services, the Sino-Indian war of 
1962 was a landmark in initiating nationalisation 
of the frontiers. Efforts were made to integrate 
NEFA emotionally with mainland India. As it is 
already mentioned, the region has a unique 
topography with distinct culture. In this context, 
two incidents are discussed below:   
 Kapo is a remote village in Siang division 
of NEFA. By the middle of November 
1962, Indian soldiers had withdrawn 
from that region due to impending 
defeat. In the absence of soldiers, the 
villagers of Kapo took it upon themselves 
to defend their village. Seeing the 
Chinese approaching Kapo, the residents 
cut off the hanging bridge on the way. 
The Chinese forces attempted thrice but 
were resisted. 
At last, the Chinese overpowered the 
local people and occupied the village and 
started to live there from  22 to 24 
November 1962. During their stay, they 
told the villagers to break away from the 
Nehru government. They harvested 
paddy from the fields of the fleeing 
people and kept them in their granary. 
Such benevolent actions were aimed at 
winning over the hearts of the simple 
tribe. However, the ethnic population of 
Kapo took cognisance of the event as a 
clear case of invasion (Hindustan 
Standard, 1963). 
 Yaaku Tacho is a woman from Dibang 
valley who worked as a spy for the 
Chinese Government (The first l author 
interviewed the daughter of Yaaku 
Tacho, where Tacho's diary in Chinese 
language was also produced). She and 
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her husband went to China with a small 
group of people from Dibang Valley. 
Most of the Mishmi people who went to 
China received education for eight to 
nine years. They viewed theChinese as 
very kind and believed that communists 
are friendlypeople. They spoke ofthe 
Chinese army as being good. Yaaku’s 
daughter remembered what her parents 
told her about the time they reached 
China: 
When we reached, we were 
welcomed. It was very nice. We were 
taught patriotism for China. We 
were told that China is the best. Boys 
and girls were kept in separate 
hostels. We were kept in a military 
school. We were always trained by 
military officers and we received 
weapons training.”(Aiyadurai& Lee, 
2017:378) 
Yaaku's diary also reflects that the 
Chinese accorded a cordial treatment to 
the Mishmis. They, therefore, were very 
much influenced by the Chinese 
propaganda stating India as their enemy 
and China their friend. Along with 
conventional education, the Mishmis 
were also provided training on the use of 
weapons. Eventually, some of the 
Mishmis even participated in the 1962 
Sino-Indian war and fought against India. 
(Aiyadurai& Lee, 2017:379) 
These two narratives speak clearly of the 
existence of ambiguity in the borderlands where 
the common people were almost isolated from 
the mainstream. In the years following 
independence and the creation of nation-states, 
people like Yaaku Tacho and others went to 
China at this point of time "for all practical 
purposes, assuming both Indian and Chinese 
nationality (Baruah, 2003:936). But ambiguous 
identity and geographic spaces pose a threat to 
the nation’s security and so nationalising such 
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The Figures 1-4 were produced by Indian 
authorities administering NEFA after the Sino-
Indian War of 1962 (Rechard, 2018). Individually 
and collectively, these  figures  painted in the 
immediate aftermath of the Sino-Indian War 
represent the beleaguered Indian authorities’ 
attempts to shape the historical memory of the 
conflict, and in doing so, to protect their position 
vis-à-vis Indian public opinion and local 
Himalayan inhabitants. Each figure encapsulates 
a scene evoking the war. In Figure 1, five NEFA 
inhabitants chase away a group of beasts with 
the body of a bison and the heads of Chinese 
soldiers. In Figure 2, the Chinese are 
represented in human form, appearing 
ominously over the crest of the Himalayas. A 
group of Indian soldiers(jawans)are ready to 
repel them, while in the foreground, four 
inhabitants tend to a wounded soldier. In Figure 
3, the Chinese invaders are still there on the 
horizon, but this time the focus is on a sari-clad 
Indian woman, looking anxiously at them while 
hugging a group of NEFA children close to her. 
Figure 4 conversely shows no trace of the 
Chinese, but the war is still there implicitly. Eight 
men—four NEFA inhabitants and four civilian 
and military representatives—hold hands, 
smiling straight ahead while Indian flags flutter 
over their heads (Rechard, 2018). 
What is striking about these figures  is that the 
focus of attention is not on the fighting, nor so 
much on the enemy, but on the relationship 
between the inhabitants of NEFA and the Indian 
state’s representatives—a relationship 
represented as defined by empathy, solidarity 
and patriotism. These posters provide another 
striking example of nationalisation effort. 
  The introduction of Hindi language in NEFA as 
the medium of instruction was a vital process of 
exercising nationalist hegemony. B. V. Kesar, the 
Minister of Information and Broadcasting (1952-
1962), Government of India believed that Hindi 
would provide 'same kind of cultural link 
between NEFA and the rest of the 
country.'(Dawar, 2001:638).  The Financial 
adviser to the Governor of Assam, Shri R.M. 
Aggarwal stated in a note that it is desirable to 
have 'a Hindi-speaking NEFA'. A policy 
document's seventh chapter devoted to the 
question of language includes the following 
directions:  
It has been now decided that Hindi will 
become the medium of higher 
instruction in NEFA and, in time, the 
lingua franca that will unite not only the 
diverse populations within its borders 
but also its people with the people of 
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the Plains, who themselves as loyal 
citizens will naturally be also learning 
the same language. All our officers, 
therefore, should not only learn Hindi 
themselves, but also should encourage 
its study in every way by the tribal 
people in their care. (Dawar, 
2001:638). 
The policy of introducing the Hindi language as 
the medium of instruction was contested by 
Assamese public opinion. They were in favour of 
the introduction of Assamese language on the 
ground that a broken form of Assamese was for 
long the accepted lingua franca between the hill 
people and the plains people. After the war of 
1962, particularly at the end of 1965, the 
position concerningthe medium of instruction 
worked out as follows: instruction in Assamese 
began in grade one, Hindi in grade three and 
English in grade four (Chowdhury 1996:257). 
When soldiers of the Indian Army and Border 
Roads Organisation employees entered the 
area, the indigenous people learnt to converse 
in Hindi. Gradually, Hindi became the lingua 
franca of different tribes inhabiting the region 
(Oinam, 2012).  
  However, the elderly population of NEFA seem 
to have not liked the widespread use of Hindi by 
the young generation. They are concerned that 
their indigenous language is under threat.  The 
elders of Yagrun village of Pasighat during 
Solung (an agricultural festival celebrated by the 
Adi tribe) festival said,  
Adi does not have a script. It is an oral 
language. Young people today do not 
know how to speak Adi. The children of 
wealthy people do not study here. They 
study far away. When they visit, they 
speak English and Hindi, though they 
are Adis. If we speak in Adi, we are 
stupid. If they can speak in English and 
Hindi, we are stupid. That is what is 
happening. They forget their own 
language.(Baruah, 2017)  
Another recent development in the state of 
Arunachal Pradesh is the entry of Sangh Parivar. 
The presence of Sangh Parivar in the state can 
be traced back to 1970s (Zavos et al., 2012). 
Proselytisation activities of Christian 
missionaries had created anti-Christian 
sentiments among the indigenous tribals.Amid 
communal tensions, the Vivekananda Kendra 
made its entry in Arunachal Pradesh by setting 
up six schools in the year 1977. Some key 
features of the school are the following:  
admission is only be given to children in the age 
group of 5-6 years; these are residential schools, 
giving importance to tradition in curriculum-
emphasis on “respecting, preserving and 
nurturing the traditional culture, values and 
customs of the people of Arunachal Pradesh 
(Joshy & Seethi, 2015:52).” During the last three 
decades, Vivekanda Kendra Vidyalaya (VKV) 
alumni have come to occupy the top-most 
positions of bureaucratic and other fields of 
social service. These former VKVstudents are the 
torchbearers of Hindu nationalism in the state. 
The VKV has two major affiliates—ArunJyoti, a 
cadre-based organisation working in the cultural 
arena indulged in integrating Hinduism with 
indigenous tradition. And  Vivekananda Kendra 
Institute of Culture (VKIC) whose fundamental 
aim is to ‘defend’ indigenous culture from the 
influence of ‘alien’ culture. In this mission, the 
VKIC has built a strong alliance with the 
intellectuals of the local communities and 
coordinates the activities of different indigenous 
organisations. Arunachal Vikas Parishad (AVP) is 
an affiliate of the RSS working among the tribal 
sections (Bertil, 2011). In this way, they are 
promoting Hindu nationalism. 
In addition to infrastructural development and 
the nationalisation of the border territories, 
there has been an ardent endeavour towards 
wild life conservation and maintaining the 
ecological balance, thereby expecting 
international support and goodwill. Keeping this 
in mind, a large number of protected areas have 
been created along the Sino-Indian border in the 
last couple of decades. But unfortunately in the 
protected areas, the indigenous people have 
lost their rights to the land and forest resources. 
In 2004, the Tsangyang Gyatso World Peace Park 
was set up at Tawang. For this biosphere reserve 
an area of2,000 sq. Km (772 sq. Mile) was 
enclosed. In 1998, the Dihang-Dibang Biosphere 
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Reserve was created spreading across an area of 
5,112  sq. Km(1973sq. Mile) In 2012, following 
the rescue of tiger cubs there, the Dibang Tiger 
Reserve was proposed, with its northern 
boundary stretching to the international border. 
An area of 4129 sq. Km of the 9129 sq. 
KmDibang Valley is designated as Dibang 
Wildlife Sanctuary but has not been named a 
Tiger reserve (A Tiger Reserve consists of a ‘core’ 
or ‘critical tiger habitat which is to be managed 
as an inviolate area, and a buffer or peripheral 
area immediately abutting a core area, which 
may be accorded a lesser degree of habitat 
protection). The President of Idu Mishmi 
Cultural and Literary Society who happens to 
represent the tribes of Dibang valley expressing 
their fear stated that as the area designated as a 
sanctuary forms a large part of the Dibang 
Valley. If the remaining area too is marked as a 
tiger reserve, it will be at the cost of the people 
habitats and farmlands (Naqvi, 2018). According 
to the Mishmis, the sanctuary was created 
without people’s consent, and this has been a 
point of contestation between the state forest 
department and the local Mishmi population. 
The Mishmi Hills is emerging as a new site for 
conservation with the efforts of conservation 
NGOs to control traditional hunting practices 
and resource use. Geographical Information 
System (GIS), remote sensing technologies, and 
camera trap technology are being used by 
scientific experts and state planners to 
showcase rich biodiversity that often excludes 
consideration of the human inhabitants in 
“favour of a focus on dense vegetation cover 
and biological complexity” (Aiyadurai& Lee 
2017:382). 
Conclusion 
The study is an attempt to analyse the socio-
economic consequences of the Sino-Indian war 
of 1962 on the ethnic communities of NEFA, 
presently the state of Arunachal Pradesh.  From 
the above discussion, it is apparent that the 
Sino-Indian war of 1962 is a landmark event in 
the socio-economic history of Arunachal 
Pradesh. Before the war, the Government 
followed a policy of gradual integration of the 
tribes of North East India with the mainstream 
of the country. The Himalayas were perceived as 
an impenetrable natural frontier. When China 
attacked in the year 1962, the Government of 
India had realised the strategic importance of 
frontier regions, including NEFA. Apart from 
being a frontier region, it was inhabited by tribes 
who had a racial affinity with the tribes living 
across the border. Therefore, the Government 
initiated a significant shift in its policies on NEFA. 
The Government not only stressed on 
development of the region, but steps were also 
taken towards nationalisation of the frontier. 
Allocation of colossal fund for the development 
of communication, improvement of medical 
facilities and education were among the primary 
development agenda undertaken by the 
Government. Nationalisation efforts in the field 
of education are particularly noteworthy. Hindi 
was introduced as the medium of instruction in 
schools. From the 1970s, Vivekananda Kendra is 
undertaking significant steps to initiate Hindu 
nationalism. The indigenous students educated 
at VKV schools have become torchbearers of 
Hindutva in Arunachal Pradesh. The colonisation 
of nature by setting up national parks and 
biosphere reserves is another noteworthy 
initiative taken by the Government of India. 
While the Government has succeeded in 
implementing its policies, it has also created 
tension between the state and the tribes. The 
indigenous tribes are concerned about losing 
identity and traditional livelihood in the wave of 
nationalisation of the frontier. This study, based 
on ethnocentric perspectives, will serve as a 
precursor to further in-depth study on the 
subject.  
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